


# Party Organizer



"Every nucleus and every Party workers' committee must be a base supporting the agitational, propaganda and organizing work among the masses, i.e., they must go wherever the masses are going and at every step endeavor to direct their consciousness towards Socialism, they must associate every private question with the general tasks of the proletariat, they must use every attempt at organization to further the cause of class consolidation and by their energy and moral influence (and not, of course, by their titles and ranks) gain the lead in every legal proletarian organization." — Lenin, "On the Road," Social Democrat No. 2.

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# PARTY ORGANIZER

Vol. VIII

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## Weld the United Front Through the Lower Organizations

By F. BROWN

**W**HAT determines the organizational tasks and the activities, of the Party? Clearly, the immediate objectives that the Party wants to reach, and the ultimate aim. If we look at the actual situation, we will see that in the last period great changes have taken place not only on an international scale, but also in the United States.

The Eighth Party Convention pointed out that the "New Deal" of Roosevelt is the aggressive effort of the bankers and trusts to find a way out of the crisis at the expense of the millions of toilers. In a few words, it characterized the "New Deal" as a program of fascization, and the most intense preparation for imperialist war.

All the events since the Eighth Convention of our Party show that this analysis was correct. The effects of the "New Deal" are here in the fullest extent. On the basis of this analysis, the Eighth Party Convention decided that the central task of the Party is to organize and lead the offensive against the capitalist class, against developing fascism and the threat of imperialist war, to develop the struggle on the basis of the fight for the immediate partial demands of the workers in the general class battles for the overthrow of capitalist dictatorship and the setting up of a Soviet government.

The Open Letter to our Party, issued before the inauguration of the "New Deal", on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation, foresaw how the bourgeoisie, pressed by the crisis, would be forced to take measures to shift the burden of the crisis on to the working class and because of that, emphasized the importance of building a mass Party, able to lead the daily struggles of the working class. The Open Letter also pointed out that for the building of a mass proletarian Party it was necessary to concentrate especially among the masses of the basic industries, and in the trade unions.

Since the Open Letter, and since the Eighth Party Convention, many events have taken place on an international and national scale, events that call for the broadest struggles

of the working class against the capitalist offensive, that call energetically for the unity of the working class against the class enemy. In this respect, the uniting of broad masses on a common platform of struggle is the best vehicle for the unity of the masses. Here immediately we see the tremendous importance of the united front policy. These great changes that have taken place in the last period, and, among them, the tremendous desire of the masses for unity following their disillusionment in the reformist policies of the Social-Democratic Party, call energetically for such a policy. Certainly today, in the United States, this has been shown by the latest struggles, (Textile strike, San Francisco, Toledo),—the American working class wants unity. The pressure of the Socialist rank and file is another evident sign of this movement.

### **The Ultimate Aim of the Communists**

One of the choice arguments of the reformists, of the class enemies, against our sincere desire to establish the united front with the Socialist Party, our desire to bring about the unity of the trade union movement, the unity of the working class, is that we want to penetrate from within, to bore from within, for the purpose of utilizing the masses for our ultimate aim.

What is the ultimate aim of the proletariat? The crushing of a system that exploits them, of building Socialism. Yet, at this particular period in the United States, the immediate task is to lead the masses to gain better conditions, to lead the masses against the effects of the N. R. A., to build the broadest united front of the masses against the rising of fascism and the war danger. While building the united front on a common platform, we show the masses the way out of the crisis, and prepare them at the same time for the not far distant struggle for power. This is the difference between the program of the Communists and that of the Socialists, who, together with other reformists, even though they may agree on a minimum program of struggle, either accept the present form of government, or stating that their aim is also to change the present system, want to bring about the change through reformist means—through the ballot, etc.

It is clear that the possibility of broadening out the united front of the masses against the capitalist offensive depends upon the extent to which the Party entrenches its position among the masses in the basic industries and in the reformist unions.

### **The Units and Fractions Must Reach the Socialist Workers**

Organizationally, through what instrument are we operating to reach the masses, to influence them, organize them, unite them on a common platform of demands, on a na-

tional, state and city scale, on the factory basis, etc.? Obviously, through our basic Party organizations,—the units, the fractions, which are the transmission belts through which we are connected with the masses and bring the masses into motion. The problem of the united front is not a problem that is confronted only by the C.C., the District Committees of the Party, but by each nucleus, each Communist fraction. The units, on a territorial basis, knowing their territory, must know the composition of the population, of the working class in that territory, must know if Socialist workers are living there, Catholic workers, what kind of organizations exist in the territory, and, knowing the issues which confront the masses in the territory, must be able to seize every opportunity to approach these workers, discuss their problems, bring them together on a common platform of struggle for their immediate economic and political needs—neighborhood issues, city issues, taxes, and whatnot.

In the shop nuclei, knowing the workers in the factory, our comrades must find out if there are Socialists, syndicalist workers, Catholic workers, and also in this case, discuss their problems with them; see how these workers react on the immediate issues that are confronting them in the factory itself, or in the trade union in which they are organized, etc. Here, immediately we see that through the units, through the shop nuclei, we can reach Socialist workers, non-Party workers, whom we can convince of the necessity of uniting on a minimum platform of struggle, and in this way, prepare them to take up the issue of the united front in their organizations. The fractions, in the mass organizations and in the trade unions, and especially in the A. F. of L., must be the driving force, the main instrument to show to the organized masses the necessity of transforming the unions from instruments led by the reformists to serve the interests of capital, of the bosses, into an organization that will fight for the interests of the workers, in class struggle organizations.

To carry out this most important task, the most important activity of the fraction is to unite all those elements that see the necessity of the struggle, over the heads of the bureaucrats controlling the union, into a powerful opposition. This, in its turn, calls for the concentration by the fractions upon the best elements for the purpose of strengthening the fractions—in other words, the Party position inside the union. It is on the strengthening of the Party inside the union that the development of the opposition will depend. The strengthening of the Party inside the union is not only the best guarantee of building the opposition, of struggling effectively against the bureaucrats, of broadening out the united front movement, but also the best way to withstand the expulsions, the discriminations, etc.

### The Socialist Leaders Cannot Prevent Unity

When we build a united front with the Socialist workers, inside the reformist unions, on the basis of inner democracy, and transform the reformist unions into organizations of class struggle, we will have a mighty wedge to force the united front in spite of the leaders. The rank-and-file Socialists want unity in the trade union field. They want a broad united front movement against war and fascism. While never ceasing our efforts to establish the united front with the Socialist Party, by approaching the leadership, it is our task—the task of the units and fractions—to reach these Socialist workers who want to fight in united struggle for the immediate economic and political needs of the working class. If we approach these Socialist workers correctly in the trade unions, in their organizations, their demands for unity will force the Socialist leadership to take a stand for or against the united front, will force them to declare whether they are for the working class or for the ruling class.

The attempt to outlaw the Communist Party, is an attempt to strike a blow against the working class. We must answer such threats with more determination in building the Party, in rooting ourselves deeper among the basic masses, in striving with all our efforts to bring about the broadest united front of the masses against the effects of the "New Deal", against fascism and war. For these reasons, the recruiting drive conducted at this time is of the utmost importance. A stronger Party, closely connected with the masses in the industries, in the trade unions, not only will stand better the attacks of the enemy, but, being connected with the broad masses, will be able to lead them in the daily struggles to the ultimate struggle.

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## Party Recruiting in the Detroit District

By MARY HIMOFF

**T**HE EIGHTH Convention of our Party passed the decision of building our Party to one of 40,000 members by January 1. At the beginning of October, the Detroit District Committee reviewed the District's recruiting work for the period since the Eighth Convention (April 1).

On the basis of this review, and the results of the C.C. Recruiting Drive, which had just been initiated, the District set itself the quota of doubling the Party membership by March 1 (having a dues-paying membership of 1,800 by that time).

In our District especially, in view of the rising unemployed struggles now taking place, and the coming struggles in the auto industry, the question of building the Party amongst the masses, and especially in the shops, is of decisive importance.

If our District is to fulfill the task it has set itself, then we must carefully examine our recruiting work in the recent period, and see what are the main shortcomings, and what are some good experiences that can be used as examples for the whole membership.

We want to deal in this article with the following:

1. An analysis of the District's recruiting from April 1 to October.
2. The C.C. October Recruiting Drive in our District.
3. The steps we must take to complete our quota by March 1.

### Recruiting Since Party Convention to October

Recruiting totals of the District during this period: April—16; May—54; June—75; July—34; August—36; September—47.

The figures for the important sections are:

Section	Concentration	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.
1	(Negro sec.)	5	1	8	2	8	4
2	(factory sec.)	2	7	3	3	4	0
7	(Ford sec.)	1	0	8	2	4	3

### Recruiting Work of the Membership

In the month of September, seeing the dangerous situation that existed on the question of recruiting, we carried through a **dues and recruiting control** of each Party member. The purpose of this control was to check on the dues-standing of the member, and, most important, on his recruiting activity. By making every member do the latter, we tried to bring sharply to the attention of our comrades—what was one of the key reasons we were not speeding ahead to fulfill the Convention decision of building the Party to one of 40,000 by January 1. Through this control it was sharply brought to the attention of each member that **the most important recruiting channel of the Party—the individual member**—was not fulfilling his task.

Here are some of the glaring facts this recruiting control showed. Out of 315 members analyzed (we registered many more—this is just an example), only 38 did any recruiting, these 38 members winning 102 workers into the Party. In other words, over 90 per cent of our members **did not recruit one member into the Party in a period of a half a year** (the control covered the period from April 1 through Sept.).

In Section 2, out of 59 members controlled, only 7 did any recruiting, winning 14 new members (out of these 7,

one comrade recruited 8 by himself). In Section 4, out of 47 registered, only 6 did any recruiting, winning 7; in Section 7 (Ford), out of 56 registered, 20 members recruited 30 new members; in Section 8, out of 56 registered, 7 recruited 11. These facts speak for themselves.

### Recruiting of Shop Units

If we examine the recruiting activity of our shop units, the decisive units of our Party in relation to mass work, we find no better situation:

Out of 4 shop units registered, with a total of 35 members controlled, only 3 units reported any recruiting. Of the 35 members in these 4 shops, only 10 did any recruiting, winning 16, only 9 of which were workers from the shops in which the units exist. In the same half year, only 1 street unit in the Ford concentration section recruited workers from the Ford shop, gaining 2.

### Composition

In the period from April 1 to September 15, we find our District recruited only 27 Negroes, only 21 women (among which there were no auto workers, and only 2 Negro women), only 12 A. F. of L. workers, and 4 workers from independent unions.

### Why Such Slow Recruiting?

The conclusions we can draw from the above figures are:

If we take into consideration the dues totals and averages for the same period, compare them with the recruiting, we find that the main problem in our District in this period in the question of Party growth is stagnation, hardly any recruiting at all.

Even if we take into consideration the fact, that during this period, auto production was at its lowest, that the unemployed struggles were still very weak, we cannot explain the slow recruiting by these reasons.

The main reasons lie in the fact that, first of all, our shop units were never guided and orientated on the problem of recruiting, and shown the methods of winning new workers into the Party, were never taught how to make this a daily task of each individual member. The fact that most of comrades felt that their membership in a shop unit was only temporary (till they would be laid off, and they could resume "normal" Party work in the street unit) also points to the fact that our comrades never really understand that the shop unit is the Party, and building the Party is linked up with the question of putting forward the Party through the shop unit work—this lack of understanding naturally was another great hindrance to recruiting in

the shop through the struggles and other work of the unit and its members.

The second reason lies in the fact that there was a general lack of consciousness among the whole membership to **recruit workers into the Party**. Our comrades do not understand as yet, that **recruiting must be done at all times**—for this comes as a result of contact with workers, and conscious, patient convincing of the correctness of the Party program, and showing these workers the necessity for joining their Party.

### **Opportunism Stands in Way of Recruiting**

During the control, and also today, we find that in personal discussions with our members, or when recruiting is discussed in the unit, a deep opportunism exists on the question of building the Party. It was sharply brought out by comrades when the C.C. Letter on recruiting was read that many of our comrades believe the "workers are not ready", "this fellow is no good", "this one won't fight", etc. At the same time, many comrades showed our sectarianism by the fact that they could not give **even the name of one worker** on whom they could work for the Party.

But examples show where there is consciousness in recruiting and confidence in the workers, and an understanding of their growing readiness for struggle, workers can be easily won for the Party. In this same period, one comrade alone recruited eight directly from his union—while in another local in which our comrades have done good work, and have good support **not one was recruited**. In another case, 7 comrades in one shop unit recruited 7 new members!

### **The October C. C. Recruiting Drive**

During the month of October, we recruited 103 members, more than double the monthly average of the preceding months, and so far the total recruitment for the first 3 weeks in November is a little higher than that for the first 3 weeks in October. It is clear that these results are still low, but they show an improvement in the correct direction. It shows that the steps we took to better the recruiting activity of the Party were correct ones.

The first step—the recruiting control of each member, brought this question sharply to our membership. Secondly the beginning of combatting the opportunism that exists on this question by showing how some comrades do recruit, bringing out examples of no recruiting especially during times of struggles in various localities, and thirdly a constant weekly check-up on recruiting.

Pressing the question, constantly hammering at it, at least changes the situation of apathy that existed on recruiting.

That this consciousness is beginning to bear fruit can be shown by the following examples: in one Section, in the preparation for a demonstration, one comrade went out leaflet distributing with a non-Party worker. In the course of the 2 hours, he got this worker to sign up and pay his initiation. In another instance, after a committee went to the welfare and had a scrap inside, they took some workers to the hall, and one comrade contacted a young American and recruited this worker. In one of our important shop groups, where the comrades now have a system of weekly visiting of contacts, and on the basis of some struggles we carried through inside, 2 new workers were recruited; one unit gave an Open Unit Party and recruited 5 shop workers; in another unit an open unit meeting was held and one foreign-born comrade brought down 2 Americans from his relief job that he is working on.

In one of our Sections (No. 8), the Section membership decided on the following: At that meeting, every comrade was given an application card, this card must be returned by each member with a **new recruit by March 1** with the signature of the Party member. The Section Org. Dept. and each unit is checking on each of these cards, and the membership decided that those comrades who will not recruit one member by March 1 will not be in good standing.

Another experience that we find works well, is the method of dividing the drive into a series of shorter periods giving the comrades small quotas for each period. These quotas can easily be fulfilled, and thus we raise the enthusiasm and confidence of all our comrades.

### Next Steps

If we examine the October recruiting, besides the fact that we are still moving too slowly, we still see that the **quality of our recruits is still far from our goal.**

Of the 103 recruited, only 21 were employed, of these only 10 were employed auto workers, the main industry of our District, and only 36 auto workers totally. Only 18 Negro workers, and only 18 women. The recruiting of A. F. of L. workers is the chief shortcoming—only 5 out of 103!

Therefore, the first step we must take, must be to help orientate our Party on the winning of shop workers and especially members of the A. F. of L. The fact that now we have assigned leading District comrades to work with every shop unit will help us to overcome this. But unless these leading comrades conscientiously take up the problem of recruiting from the shop, help the comrades in the shop units to solve their difficulties, we will remain where we were. In the next period the shop units must become the decisive recruiting weapons of the Party. That this can be done is

shown by the example mentioned above—where in one week 2 members were recruited.

Our fractions in the A. F. of L. must overcome their present attitude towards recruiting. In certain auto locals, as well as in other trades, there are some splendid examples of the response of the members to programs and actions for struggle—and yet there is no recruiting.

In order to fulfill our quota by March 1, we are carrying through the drive in the following way:

1. The Drive has been divided into 3 periods:
  - a. November 1 to December 1.
  - b. December 1 to January 21 (Lenin Memorial).
  - c. January 21 to March 1.
2. Each Section has worked out quotas for itself, totals which will double their membership by March 1.
3. Use of socialist competition in drive:
  - a. The Sections decided to contribute to a fund for a prize that will be given to the best Section at end of the drive.
  - b. There will be two banners in the drive: a **red banner** for the Section completing its quota best, a **black banner with a yellow turtle** for the slowest Section. These banners will be given at the end of each period at open meetings, where the slowest Section will come up for open criticism—the best Section will keep the red banner at the end of the drive.
  - c. Some Sections are now working out the terms of socialist competition wagers among themselves, also units within Sections.

In Section 8, the Section Organizer was so determined not to get the turtle banner, that at his membership meeting, he himself brought in 2 recruits as an example to the members, and within one week his Section got 6 new members, whereas previously they never averaged more than 2.

4. The District is issuing a Special Recruiting Bulletin every 2 weeks, giving good examples, the standing of the Sections, with a Turtle list of all Sections averaging less than 2 recruits per week.

In this article, we do not deal with the question of **Daily Worker** and recruiting, use of literature, and also the question of new members, which it is evident are problems linked with the success of any recruiting work. We just wanted to give an analysis of the recruiting work of our District, and some of the measures we are taking to carry through the Convention decision of “doubling the recruiting activity of the Party”, thus overcoming the big lag that still exists in building a mass Party.

## Too Many Campaigns—or, Not Enough Communists—Which Is Correct?

By J. BRANDT, Org. Sec. 1, Dist. 2.

**D**URING the last few months, we have been seriously discussing in the District, Section, and units the question of campaigns and how to carry them through effectively. And while we are discussing the correct question of the efficient way of conducting these campaigns, co-ordinating them and making them part of the general work of our Party, many wrong notions and dangerous ideas have been expressed by a number of comrades, which, if they are not cleared up and explained, may in a way hamper the general work of our Party in New York.

The writer of this article pleads guilty to having had such wrong ideas until recently.

### What Is a Party Campaign?

What is this wrong notion and wrong tendency? It expressed itself in the argument being put forth by many comrades that we are conducting and starting too many campaigns. In order to find out why such ideas are wrong, we must first of all define the meaning of a campaign. What is a campaign? A campaign is a certain concrete task or a phase of our general activity which is called forth very sharply at a certain period and under certain conditions by the development of the class struggle, and in order that our Party may not lag behind, but remain the leader and organizer of the working-class struggles, we must concentrate all our forces to achieve a definite objective within a limited period of time, and at the same time, advance our general Party work and win over for our program greater numbers of workers during the carrying through of this concentrated task or campaign by the whole Party.

These campaigns are not the brainstorm of any individual Party member, nor are they the fancy of the Party leadership. These campaigns are the results of the sharpening of the class struggle, and if our Party is to continue to lead this struggle, the struggle of the working class, it must foresee these campaigns and plan efficiently for their effective carrying through.

In other words, the class struggle and the sharpening of this class struggle decides for our Party the number of campaigns we are to undertake and carry through at a certain given period.

If the above is correct, then the perspective must be the

preparing of our Party for more and more campaigns, because the class struggle is not lessening but on the contrary, it's becoming sharper daily.

Therefore, to say that we have too many campaigns and that we should cut some of them out is demanding that our Party should trail behind the struggles of the working class instead of carrying out its historic role as the leader and organizer of the struggles of the working class. Such an idea, therefore, is wrong and dangerous, politically.

### Not Enough Campaigns

The trouble is not too many campaigns, the contrary is true, not enough campaigns. If we analyze the recent developments in the U. S. A., and specifically in New York City, we will find that our Party has not carried on enough campaigns, it has not reacted on a number of occasions and has failed to develop campaigns around some of the most basic, immediate issues of the working class, called forth by the sharpening of the class struggle, as for instance, the struggle against the recent sales tax which we foresaw coming many weeks ago, or the struggle against the high cost of living.

Why didn't we carry out these and many other campaigns? Is it because we were busy with other campaigns, or that we had too many campaigns? No. Certainly not. We didn't do it because we haven't got enough "man power", not enough Communists, not enough Red organizers among the unemployed and part-time workers, not enough Red organizers in the factories, (which means not enough shop nuclei), not enough Red organizers in the trade union movement. This is the basic and most outstanding weakness of our Party.

### We Need More Communists

Comrade Browder recently stated correctly in a number of articles in the **Daily Worker**, that the reason why it was possible for the betrayers of the American Labor Movement, the Gormans, the Greens, the Axtells, etc., to betray the Textile Strike and the West Coast Strike, is because there were not enough Red textile workers to organize hundreds of additional flying squads, not enough Communist textile workers who would explain and expose the real role of the A. F. of L. betrayers, not enough Red organizers who would become the leaders of the textile workers and organize them for the carrying through of an effective strike struggle.

Why were we in New York City forced to make an organized retreat in the recent marine strike? Because there were not enough Communist seamen on the ships and on the beach, organizing the seamen for effective strike action.

Why, in the face of such miserable conditions, of the New York longshoremen, such tremendous unemployment among them, could we not lead the longshoremen in a sympathy strike with the seamen? Because there are very few Communist longshoremen or Red organizers on the docks.

It is the lack of numbers in our ranks that makes the carrying out of our campaigns difficult. Of course, one cannot deny the fact that we haven't yet learned to effectively coordinate, unite, and organize our campaigns, but this is only a secondary problem.

### **Strengthen the Recruiting**

In order to effectively keep up with events in the U. S. A., our Party must double and treble its membership, now, not next year. There is enough work in our Party for 100,000 Communists to be kept busy every day in the week and now, no more than 30,000 are doing it.

**Therefore the slogan must be: More Communists, more Red organizers to conduct and carry out effectively more campaigns!**

Another important problem, which is closely related with the one above, is the argument by some of our actives in the units, while discussing the results of the Election Campaign. The argument is, that "We were too busy with the Election Campaign and the Hunger March to recruit new members and now that the Election Campaign is over we will really start the recruiting campaign."

Those comrades who put forward the argument that "we are too busy to recruit", do not understand what we have already stated above, that the sharper the class struggle becomes, the greater the responsibility of the Communist Party, and the more numerous the campaigns. Therefore, if we do not seriously organize the limited number of our forces to carry on mass recruiting during the carrying out of a campaign, we will not be in a position to carry out our responsibilities to the working class.

Why must we recruit during the carrying out of a campaign? 1. Because during that period we involve great numbers of workers in a struggle for their immediate demands and the best Party members are those who come to us as a result of our leading them in struggle. 2. Because during a campaign we speak to, agitate among, and mingle with great numbers of workers.

We must further carry on recruiting during a campaign so that after a campaign like the Washington Congress is over, we will have greater numbers of Party members to carry out the decisions made at this Congress, and thus be in a position to develop the struggle for the Workers' Unem-

ployment and Social Insurance Bill to a higher stage, by having thousands of additional Red organizers, organizing additional millions of American workers in support of the struggle for unemployment and social insurance.

Therefore, the above argument raised by a number of actives is wrong. Our slogan must be: **The more campaigns we have and the more active we are in carrying through these campaigns the greater the possibility of mass recruiting and the building of a mass Communist Party. Every member recruit a least one new member in preparation for the Washington Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance!**

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“Question: What should our supporters in the united trade unions take as their basic methods and forms of work?”

“The Communists should give especially careful thought to the demands they put forward during strikes, popularizing them among the trade union membership and striving to ensure even before the beginning of the strike struggle that a compact mass will support them. If this is not done, the supporters of reformist methods will make use of the first failure of the trade unions to discredit the Communists. The Communists should make use of trade union democracy in the united trade unions to develop to the utmost the initiative and activity of the membership, helping them in every possible way to mobilize their forces for the struggle. We should avoid sharpening the conflict around secondary, formal questions and we should make concessions at times to the reformists on petty points, in order to be able all the more strikingly and convincingly to defend our viewpoint before the membership on more important questions. **The Communists should combine the maximum flexibility with their steadfastness in principle.** The broad masses of the members will then understand our policy more rapidly and the Communists will gain from the unity of the trade unions.

“Piatnitsky, ‘Problems of the International Trade Union Movement’.

“**The Communist International No. 22.**”

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## Lessons of the Denver F.E.R.A. Strike

By GENE GORDON, Sec. Org., Denver

**T**HE PARTICIPATION of the Communist Party, Denver Section, in the Arapahoe County strike of relief workers, was a definite political achievement. At one stroke, the Party succeeded in overcoming its sectarian status with the unemployed workers. The strike resulted in several victories: the dismissal of Shawver, federal relief administrator; the increase of relief appropriations instead of a threatened cut; and the political exposure of the capitalist politicians to the workers on election eve. These victories were impossible without the entrance and mobilization of the Party in the struggle. In fact, before the Party took up the strike, opportunists in the American Workers Union were laying the basis for defeat of the strike, first, by labeling it a "protest and not a strike" and second, by assuring the workers that strike action would probably be unnecessary as the officials were inclined to accept the main demand for restoration of the budgets. Moreover, after the strike was under way, the Executive Committee of the A.W.U., under the leadership of Golden, stopped the militant mass picketing. This picketing was resumed, and with such militant character as to shut down all projects in Arapahoe County and turn the tide of the strike—only because the Communist Party raised the issue of rank-and-file militant action and control, forced the leadership to resume mass picket action, and gave a splendid example of how to do it on the picket line.

The decision to attempt to spread the strike was politically correct in spite of the insufficient organizational preparation for such a step. There was an objective basis for such an attempt, wide-scale budget cuts, lay-offs and discharges, and announced budget reductions for the next two months. Also, the motorcade picket forces were large enough to provide mass picketing in Denver. Leaflets were issued for distribution on the projects.

Great terror was used by the police to crush the strike. Police squads visited the projects and instructed the workers to stay on the job. Several hundred police with tear gas, riot guns, pistols and clubs and several machine guns, were stationed at the main project where the picketing was expected. The motorcade made a flying detour and picketed another project and succeeded in pulling out most of the workers. But the infuriated police, strengthened by riot squad reserves, attacked the strike leaders and shot and clubbed workers who defended themselves from attack. This action was followed by raids, arrests, closing of meeting halls and breaking up of meetings.

The announcement of the increased budget appropriation made the continuation of the strike impossible. As a result of its contributions to the strike, two branches of the International Labor Defense were set up in Englewood and Garden Home (Arapahoe County). The Arapahoe workers who before the entrance of the Party in the strike, were strongly attached to nationalist, chauvinist and fascist ideologies, were swung sharply toward the Communist position and came under the influence of our Party. These were real achievements.

#### Weaknesses of the Strike

However, it is not only the political gains to which we must pay attention. The organizational weaknesses and the lessons gained from the strike must be strongly brought out in order that we may improve our future work. These weaknesses were numerous and important.

First of all, though most of the units functioned in the face of terror, there was a serious disconnection between the Section leadership and the lower organs which made co-ordinate action impossible. The connection among the Section leadership was also too loose to be effective.

Secondly, insufficient preparations for the strike action was an outstanding weakness. The failure of the Relief Workers Protective Union and Unemployment Councils to organize the workers in Denver on the projects was a main weakness. While this weakness was organizational, it resulted from the poor leadership of our Party members in these organizations, their inability to bring forward the Party line in these organizations. The R.W.P.U. failed to mobilize its membership in the strike entirely. A thousand "Don't Scab" leaflets were found in the hall two days after they had been left there for distribution. Thousands of leaflets calling for strike action in Denver were not distributed on the projects.

Third, there was a serious underestimation of the possibilities of terror and an even more serious underestimation of the necessity for continued mass action in the face of terror. The Party and the mass unemployed organizations, even the I.L.D., were not prepared to function under terror. This weakness also had a political base, the opportunism which expressed itself in the theory that Denver was a "liberal" administration.

A fourth weakness of the strike, was the slow pace to consolidate the political gains into organizational gains. Recruiting into the Party was practically negligible. This, in part, was not inexcusable. The action lasted only eight or nine days, and our Party members, living miles away from the strike area, came into the action without personal acquaintances. It took us three days to convince the workers that our line was correct. During this time we could not

recruit; and with the terror, because we were not prepared, we did not recruit. But the leading comrade, a member of the District Buro, who knew the workers very well, failed to do any recruiting; and our fraction in the I.L.D. took the line of "building the I.L.D. first." While we did not succeed organizationally, we can say politically there was no opportunism in the strike. From the first mass meeting, Party speakers boldly brought out the Party as an independent political organization; and did this so well, supported by fair mobilization on the picket line, that when the chief of police and the fakers raised the "Red Scare", it failed completely.

There was also a real weakness in our propoganda and agitation in leaflets. In the first three days, we issued three leaflets which were effective; although one leaflet, attacking the Socialist Party, failed to differentiate between the leadership and the rank and file. Our third leaflet corrected this. But when the terror began, we issued no leaflets. The **Daily Worker** was circulated among the strikers, but not in sufficient quantities. We did succeed very well in linking up the election campaign with the strike. We also linked up the strike with the demand for social and unemployment insurance (H.R. 7598) which was one of the strike demands. but we did not circulate the bill among the strikers and failed to bring before them during the strike the question of delegates to the National Congress.

### **Strengthen the Organizational Front**

Our main lesson from the strike is the necessity to strengthen the organizational front, to tighten up the Party apparatus; to strengthen the Section leadership with new, proved elements, to strengthen our Org. department and to establish an agit-prop department under a capable comrade assigned to this work.

A change of Party leaders in the unemployed organizations must be made and new promising elements brought to the front. We must particularly develop initiative in the units, strengthen the units organizationally and establish solid connections between the units and the Section leadership.

We must intensify our efforts in Arapahoe County, our recruiting, and establish a Party unit from the best elements. We must overcome the sectarian organization of the unemployed groups, shifting their action from general agitation and general organization to job organization and the establishment of neighborhood locals of the U.C. and R.W.P.U. We must intensify our campaign for social and unemployment insurance. Finally, we must strengthen our anti-fascist activities and establish in Denver a branch of the American League Against War and Fascism.

## Women's Delegate Meetings

By M. COWL

**D**ELEGATE meetings are one of the principal forms of organization by means of which contact is established between the Communist Party and the broad masses of working women.

Through the system of delegate meetings, women workers organized and particularly unorganized, unemployed women and wives of workers, are called together regularly on questions of vital and immediate interest to working women such as wage-cuts, particular grievances in certain factories, unemployment, social insurance, dismissal of married women, high cost of living, the fight for free milk and lunches for school children, etc. At these meetings definite decisions are made in connection with these various issues, immediate demands and slogans are discussed and concrete tasks are given to the delegates to be carried out in their factories, organizations or in the localities where they live.

Particular efforts should be made to draw into these delegate meetings working women from the reformist unions and the enemy bourgeois organizations and to mobilize these women for the carrying out of the decisions of the delegate meetings. In this way, delegate meetings constitute a broad united front under the leadership of the Communist Party for the preparation of working women for the revolutionary class struggle.

By means of delegate meetings working women are given a political understanding and training, they are drawn into active participation in the campaigns of the Party and the revolutionary unions, and the most active delegates are recruited into the ranks of the Communist Party. With proper organization and follow-up, delegate meetings serve as an instrument in organizing new shop nuclei and in strengthening the work of the nuclei which already exist.

### Where to Organize Delegate Meetings

Delegate meetings are organized first of all in industrial districts and are called by working women's united front committees under the guidance and control of the Communist Party. Strikes, preparation for strike struggles, offer a very favorable opportunity for the organization of delegate meetings, as well as Party campaigns (March 8th, May 1st, August 1st, struggle against unemployment, high cost of living, etc.).

These meetings of women delegates can be organized on the following basis:

(1) In large factories where women workers predominate, when an opportune situation arises (wage-cut, accident from unguarded machine, lack of proper sanitation, etc.), delegates or groups of women should be gotten from as many departments as possible to discuss the grievance in detail and how to organize to fight against it. If a delegate meeting cannot be held in the factory it should be held in the homes of the workers or some other suitable place.

(2) Small factories of a given territory are united into groups which together send their delegates to section delegate meetings. As soon as delegates have been elected from 2 or 3 large factories or groups of small factories, District Delegate meetings begin to function even though on a very small scale.

(3) In districts where there are very few factories, or few women working in them, delegate meetings are organized to which working women are elected from the largest possible number of factories as well as from other enterprises in the neighborhood.

(4) Delegates from the factory as well as the district delegate meetings are elected not only by women workers but also by the wives of the workers of given factories, unemployed women who previously worked there, etc. However, workers' wives and unemployed women should constitute only a small percentage of the delegates, no more than 25 percent.

(5) In districts where men workers predominate (mining, steel, railroads, etc.) delegate meetings are made up primarily of the wives of the workers in these districts. Wherever there are women working in these areas, these delegate meetings must draw them into activity.

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## After the National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance

By I. AMTER

**T**HE DISTRICTS, almost without exception—the only exception being Ohio and Philadelphia—have been slow and negligent about the preparations for the National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance. The District and Section leadership have not only underestimated the importance of the Congress, but, as a result, have failed to penetrate into the mass organizations, especially the unions, fraternal, and Negro organizations, etc., as they easily might have done. **There is no issue on which we should have been able to rally the workers and workers' organizations better than the issue of social insurance.**

The more than five years of the crisis, the extension of misery into every working class home, and particularly the growing insecurity not only of the unemployed, but also of the employed workers, have awakened a spirit of deep unrest among the masses. In addition, the campaign for social insurance carried on by the Party and the sympathetic organizations has raised the issue of unemployment and social insurance to a central question before the entire population. This has been so effective that the federal government can no longer keep it off the "must list" of legislation, but has been compelled to set up commissions and to promise that this will be one of the first questions before the U. S. Congress.

The campaign in preparation for the Congress, with all the shortcomings that have been shown, demonstrates that, with the proper approach on the proper issue, we can reach more organizations than ever before. In spite of the vicious attacks by Green through circulars and in speeches (before the Dickstein committee); in spite of the Workers Bill being assailed by Roosevelt as "fantastic", and by Farley as "crazy", the number of new organizations that have endorsed the Bill and the Congress is continually growing. This shows the correctness of the line of the Party in making unemployment insurance a central question and enlarging the possibility of reaching new workers with the program of the Party.

**The Washington Congress must not be regarded as an end-all of our work.** On the contrary, the Congress is only the bringing together of forces that sincerely wish to fight for genuine unemployment and social insurance. The struggle will take on new forms and new dimensions after the Congress.

What do we expect out of this Congress? We will effect a broad mobilization of forces not only of those that support the Workers' Bill, but others who may have other proposals. The Congress will serve for clarification of the whole question of unemployment and social insurance: the right of workers to adequate compensation when they are unable to work; the responsibility of the employers and the government to supply this compensation; the question of whether the income for the fund must be put on a "sound budgetary" basis—that is pay for itself; the question of the "constitutionality" of a federal bill, etc. The Congress will map out a course of action—such action as has already aided in making social insurance the central question—**mass actions** in various forms.

The **State legislatures** will be meeting at the same time as the U. S. Congress. They will have before them various bills for unemployment insurance. Some legislatures will wait upon the action of the U. S. Congress, guiding themselves in accordance. It becomes clear, therefore, that the National Congress will have to plan its work in two directions: one plan for exerting mass pressure upon the U. S. Congress, the other, as part of the general plan, for exerting pressure upon the State legislatures.

#### **Tasks After the Congress**

This therefore, requires immediate action, particularly by the Districts and Sections. The National Congress will set up a National Committee of Action, or National Continuations Committee. The State caucuses at the Congress will set up at least the skeleton of State Continuations Committees, to continue the work on a state-wide scale. The work in the states will be to continue the fight for the Workers' Bill, by building up the organization in all cities and towns. This means the establishment of Local Committees for Unemployment and Social Insurance, basing them upon the local sponsoring committees, but drawing into the committees delegates from new local unions, unemployed and fraternal organizations, veteran, Negro, Church, youth, women's organizations, that endorse the Congress and the Bill that it sponsors. This can be a means of drawing more organizations directly into the struggle for the Bill. **That these contacts may be used for forming oppositions in the reformist unions, fraternal, unemployed organizations, etc., is obvious.**

Based upon these Local Committees, the State Continuations Committees will have to plan the work of bombarding the State legislatures in support of our Bill. This necessitates the following:

1. The procurement of a State representative and a State

senator to introduce our Bill in the two houses of the State legislature. This should be done immediately by means of sending delegations to their homes, demonstrations, resolutions, etc. Once introduced, we must

2. Be prepared through state marches (in those states in which it is possible in the winter months) or through broad delegations to present our Bill to the State legislatures. When such presentation is made, it should be backed up by demonstrations in all cities and counties.

3. Open hearings will be held on the various unemployment insurance bills. A representative delegation of all kinds of organizations from the various parts of the state must be sent to these hearings, backed by meetings and demonstrations in the cities, resolutions, etc.

4. In order to exert still more pressure, we must flood the president, the Congressmen and U. S. Senators, as well as the governors, state senators and representatives with resolutions, post cards, telegrams, etc.

5. At the same time, efforts must be made to procure further endorsements of the Bill not only from shops and organizations, but also from central labor bodies, state federations of labor, international unions, large mass organizations—especially the **American** fraternal orders—and from city councils. Resolutions from these bodies should be sent to the federal and state governments. These organizations should be drawn into the Local Committees for Unemployment and Social Insurance through delegates.

It is obvious that the Workers' Bill will be passed **only** through the greatest mass pressure and struggle. It becomes one of our **outstanding tasks** to make the workers in the shops understand the importance to them of unemployment and social insurance—not only in case they are fired or laid off, but also when they prepare for strikes, which stand on the order of business for the workers of most industries. The fear of scabs taking their place, with the protection of the government, acts to keep many workers from struggle. We must therefore carry on propaganda in the shops and unions on this issue through leaflets, pamphlets, meetings, etc., laying the groundwork for **strikes**—if only of short duration—in the shops to force the government to enact the Workers' Bill. This agitation will bring forward many new workers, new fighters. This will enable us to build opposition groups in the unions, help us form shop nuclei.

This campaign will continue for **two or three months**. It is not simply "another campaign." It is a central campaign, which our districts have not yet recognized in action, although they talk about it.

### Strengthen the Unemployment Council

While carrying on this work, we must immediately **build and strengthen the Unemployment Council**. The government's plan of forced labor, subsistence homesteads, etc., will lower the conditions of the unemployed still more. The unemployed are willing to struggle, as witness the recent struggles in Arizona, Cleveland, Texas, etc. But the Party is giving them insufficient leadership, not only through decisions and resolutions, but through the assignment of proper forces, which once assigned must remain to carry on the work. The problem of building the N.U.C., of forming the united front with the other unemployed organizations for eventual, but speedy unity of the unemployed organizations of the country, is a first-rate task, which every District and Section must tackle.

While carrying on this work, we must rapidly recruit into the Party and Y.C.L. Out of the struggle for the Workers' Bill and through building the opposition and setting up new Unemployment Councils, we should recruit most energetically into the Party, thus strengthening the organization and our leadership in the organization.

There is no time to be lost—the campaign is under way. What the Districts did not do in preparation for the Congress, they must do manifold for continuing the struggle.

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“For correct leadership by the Party it is necessary, apart from everything else, that the Party policy should be correct, that the masses should understand the correctness of the Party policy and actively support it, that the Party should not confine itself to working out a general line of policy, but should direct its application in practice from day to day, that the Party should wage a resolute struggle against deviations from the general line and the conciliatory attitude towards deviations, and that in the struggle against deviations the Party should hammer out the unity of its ranks and iron discipline.”

“But the Party cannot confine itself to working out a general line of policy. It must also verify from day to day the extent to which the general line is being applied in practice. It must direct the application of the general line, in the course of its improving and perfecting the plans which have been adopted, correcting and anticipating mistakes.”

—Stalin, Political Report to Sixteenth Party Congress.

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## Report on Org. Work in a Waterfront Concentration Unit

Submitted by UNIT 34, Sec. 1, N. Y.

**S**INCE we had helped to make some of the mistakes of earlier Section 1, District 2 in its waterfront work, some of us in the Buro of the new unit, No. 34, had a very clear conception of these errors.

We knew that we had to have several developed comrades from the docks themselves to lead the rank-and-file work or it would fall apart and not reflect the actual needs and moods of the men. We also knew that pure and simple trade unionism did not reflect adequately the needs and interests of the men. So we did not hide the face of the Party in any sense.

What we did was to first concentrate on the four most likely contacts. Only one of these proved unsuitable for the Party and so we soon had the beginnings of a dock nucleus, which we proceeded to develop into the habit of meeting regularly and to work with, giving and taking political education from the men. To the entire unit membership we emphasized the need for becoming a part of the lives of their contacts, at least until these contacts were fully developed.

As soon as the nucleus was formed we issued a dock paper. Because of the marine strike the first issue was brought out in a great hurry and contained errors. But even the first one had almost all the information furnished by the workers, and it became popular immediately. The workers objected only to the Party name but not to the political articles, and we refused to change the name. The fourth issue, just out, is already edited and written almost entirely by the longshoremen themselves. This was the most popular issue, and furthermore, an intermediate issue, where we wrote more, was the least popular.

We know the principal objection of the workers on every dock to activity, was danger of job discrimination. So we adopted strictly underground methods of organization, advertising our careful investigation of all applicants, and at the same time we told every new Communist that he would have to fight for our program in the union.

The first of our leaflets from the outside was called "What the Communist Party Means to You", and explained why outside Communists were on the docks, that the Communist Party fights for the unity of all workers. We have also issued leaflets on the **Daily Worker**, the way to win a

strike, on relief, on unemployment and social insurance. Of course, we sell the language press and the **Daily Worker** as well as pamphlets.

Outside of a correct union and Party line and concentration, our principal emphasis to the outside comrades has been on precision in keeping appointments and being seen with the literature. The men stress this a great deal, and we have obtained it. **We do not ask anyone to accept an unreasonable number of assignments**, even though we have only about eleven members of the outside unit who can appear on the docks. We do have a minimum assignment of two mornings a week on the dock for each comrade unless, for some reason, he is temporarily excused. We also have double check-up (in the mornings and in the unit), and transfer of those comrades who cannot do this kind of work. The basis of this system of check-up is that the organizer does more of the routine work than any other single comrade (from 3 to 6 mornings a week), at the same time that he tries to delegate responsibilities to the other comrades.

But this tells only half the story. We think we were able to get such a high standard of discipline because, first, the Section sent us selected comrades to begin with, and second, because of the high quality of the agitprop work (we always have our discussions and have them linked up with our day-to-day work, and we accept regular reading assignments which are checked upon). Details of this are left for the agitprop report. The Buro has also issued a circular on methods of work to the comrades.

We also certainly have our shortcomings. We have rather consistent guidance from the Section Buro in trying to eradicate them, and the rank and file in the unit is developing a healthy tendency to criticize and suggest as it gets more experience. (A decision just passed by the Buro is to invite to the Buro meeting each week the comrade who is to lead that week's discussion. In this way we will have a circulation of the rank and file members of the unit through the Buro meetings, a greater sensitiveness of the Buro to the feeling and understanding of the unit, and a better understanding by the comrades of the unit problems.)

After about seven weeks of work we established a functioning nucleus, and many more or less qualified contacts for the Party and the union rank and file. We hope that we shall soon get forces to develop the latter. Furthermore, we understand that by learning the same lessons from practically the same mistakes as were made in Section 1, Section 3 has already completed its quota in the membership drive for longshoremen.

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# AGITPROP SECTION

## Report on Agitprop Work of a Waterfront Concentration Unit

Submitted by UNIT 34, Sec. 1, N. Y.

**B**ECAUSE our activities are well routinized and we do not have to waste time over assignments, we have been able to fulfill a planned-out agitprop program, both within the unit and on our concentration dock, both programs being intimately connected, as can be seen by the items following:

### I. Inner Unit Life

a. **Discussions** are held at the beginning of our meetings. The comrade who leads the discussion is given from 20 to 30 minutes. Then we take turns, each comrade trying to link up the discussion with his work on the dock.

b. **Reading Assignments.** Each week a pamphlet (or an article in *The Communist* or *C. I.* magazine) is assigned as preparatory reading for the following week's discussion. Each unit member gets a copy. Those who cannot pay are loaned copies, which are bought with our unit library fund.

c. **Check-up on Reading Assignments.** The agitprop calls the name of each comrade who then answers yes or no, on whether he has read the assigned pamphlet, and also tells whether he has made up a previous unperformed assignment. Discussions have been carried out 100%; reading assignments, about 60%. We plan to raise this percentage by gathering in groups to read together, and by taking the assigned pamphlet to the home of any comrade who happens to be absent.

d. **Unit Library.** 50c every second week was voted for this. Contributions are also made. Borrowing preference is given to comrades fulfilling assigned reading.

e. **Party Organizer** is distributed 100 percent in the unit. Those who cannot pay for it get it free. (This money does not come out of unit library fund.)

f. **Literature Agent** gives a 2 or 3-minute review of one or two featured pamphlets, distributes periodicals (which are subscription orders), urges comrades to take literature for outside sales, asks for orders for anything the comrades may be especially interested in.

## II. Agitprop Work in Our Concentration

a. **Daily Worker.** 20 sold and distributed daily, 100 distributed on Fridays (when marine news is featured). 100 were distributed daily during the strike. **Unita Operaias** and **Ukrainian Daily News** are also taken to dock.

b. **Leaflets.** The agitprop has responsibility for these, but others take part in the work. They are looked over by at least a couple of comrades; if there is time also by a Section functionary or a leading comrade in waterfront work, if possible. In getting out the leaflets, we keep ourselves sensitive to the needs of our work on the dock. In the past ten days we have distributed a series of three leaflets on relief and unemployment insurance. We will put out a fourth in this series, dealing with the January Congress. This will be distributed just before an open air meeting at which the longshoremen will be asked to sponsor sending a delegate to the Congress. In the ten weeks since the formation of our unit, we have distributed about 12 leaflets, approximately half written by us. The last few leaflets have been in English on one side and Italian on the other.

c. **Bulletin.** The fifth issue is coming out this week. Beginning with the 4th issue, the bulletin went into the hands of the dock nucleus which we formed. Out of 8 columns in that issue (four pages, 2 cols. each), two were written by comrades from the concentration unit, the equivalent of one column was taken up with drawings, and 5 columns were written by the longshore comrades themselves. The fifth issue will be still more independently theirs. The bulletin has gained a definite respect and audience on our concentration dock. (Leading articles are also in Italian)

d. **Street Meeting.** Three meetings have been held on the dock. A few will be held in preparation for the Washington Congress, to which a delegate will be sent.

e. **Pamphlet Distribution.** Pamphlets are distributed and sold at meetings, in general distributions, and attached to the bulletins. 400 election platforms were attached to the "Special Election Issue." 200 copies of **Why Communism?** (150 English and 50 Italian) have been divided into four parts each, to be attached to four successive issues. The first part was attached to the last issue.

## III. Tie-Up of Agitprop Work in Unit, Dock Nucleus, and on Dock

Where possible, a subject or campaign is handled so as to get these parts of the work closely related. The following are examples:

1. Unemployment insurance and the coming Congress. A two-week discussion in unit. A discussion in the dock nucleus. Bulletins now being prepared to be a "Special

Unemployment and Social Insurance Issue." Distribution of Unemployment Insurance Review (and cards) in units and dock. 3 leaflets issued on relief, the last one giving addresses of Councils, and telling the men they would be given special attention that week. A fourth leaflet is being prepared for the open air meeting to be held this week.

b. **Trade Union Policy.** A discussion was held in the unit some weeks ago. A second discussion on "Methods of Work." A paper on this (in addition to assigned reading) drawn up and presented by the buro to the unit. A discussion based on Comrade Stachel's article in the November issue of **The Communist**, assigned to a comrade for preparation (November issue of **The Communist** is in the hands of nearly all members of the unit. We are considering No. 22 of **C. I.** magazine as assigned reading for this discussion.) A discussion in the dock nucleus. Agitation in past issues of bulletin towards rank and file organization. Steps taken at last meeting of dock nucleus to start crystalizing this. We are discussing making the sixth issue of the bulletin (following issue now being prepared) a "Special Rank-and-File Issue."

The keynote of our work in developing our contacts (especially those who have already joined the Party) is personal attention; personal talks, taking them to Party affairs, etc.

We believe that with our 96 percent attendance, 100 percent carrying out of our discussion program (started about 6 weeks ago), and 60 percent completion of study assignments, we have a record as good as most classes in the Workers School. Each one of our meetings is also a class, and we believe a comrade who attends regularly in our unit has, in 12 weeks, the equivalent of a term in the Workers School. In this way we have worked in the direction of bringing the school into the unit. Should we be disconnected from the school facilities, we are prepared to continue educational work right in the unit.

The agitprop director has the responsibility for seeing that the agitprop work is carried out, but the agitprop work itself has actually been done by many different comrades in the unit. (Leaflets written in co-operation. Other comrades in charge of street meetings. Discussions led, as much as possible, in rotation, etc.)

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## Lessons of Literature Sales in the Election Campaign

By ROBERT FRANKLIN, Dist. 2.

**T**HE ELECTION Campaign is over. Some of our comrades will now lean back with a sigh of relief and feel, well, that is over now. But we must rudely awaken these comrades and not allow them to forget that what was to them a campaign separate and apart, was in fact only one link in the chain of our daily struggle against the capitalist class.

What were some of the lessons learned in the distribution of 500,000 copies of the election platforms?

Last year the Election Campaign Committee distributed 250,000 free copies of the platforms. (Incidentally, they were printed only a month or so before the election date.) This year, the Election Campaign Committee decided that it would be better for the campaign work 1) if the election platforms were printed on time, which they were; and 2) if these platforms were sold to the workers at 1c a piece. The reasons for this were: a) Many New York workers do not read anything that is given to them free of charge, because they feel that someone is trying to put something over on them, but a worker will read what he pays for. b) In the act of trying to get a worker to buy a penny platform our comrades must talk to these workers and say something about the campaign. This forces our comrades to do direct personal contact work with individual workers, instead of just standing on the street corner and passing out copies of the platform, which litter up the streets for block around.

The instructions given to our Sections were as follows:

1. Set a quota of 50 election platforms per each member during the campaign period.

2. The Section must **not** "dish out" 100 copies or so to each unit the moment it receives the platforms, and then wait for the unit to make up its mind to come back for more. On receipt of the platforms each unit must immediately be given its full quota for the entire campaign, and those units which did not call during that week, were to be visited and their quota delivered to them.

3. We urged that at least once a week each Party member canvass with these platforms from house to house.

4. Each shop nucleus should sell these platforms within the factories wherever it was possible to do so. Where this was impossible, comrades in street units should be assigned to distribute the platforms to the workers in that particular factory.

5. Every comrade who did house to house canvassing for the **Daily Worker** should also carry copies of election platforms.

6. No street meeting should be conducted without the sale and distribution of the platform.

7. Where a free distribution was to be made at an open air meeting, a collection was to be taken up a) to cover part of the election campaign expenses, and b) to help pay for the distribution of the platforms to unemployed workers who cannot afford to buy them.

How were these instructions carried out?

The reports we have on hand show that where these directions were followed the results were largely successful.

Individual reports state, "I went out canvassing for the two Red Sundays and I sold 20 one time and 25 the next. If I would have gone out more, there is no question in my mind that I would have sold more."

One comrade in Section 18, sold 295 platforms in three days of canvassing.

One woman comrade reported that whenever she went canvassing for the **Daily Worker** she sold from 5 to 10 platforms. In fact, she found that it was easier to sell platforms than it was to sell a **Daily Worker** (maybe because the worker felt that the newspaper gave her only the news of the day, but here she was buying a penny book which she could always save and keep.)

The Section Organizers of 6 and 15 reported that they themselves sold 20 to 30 platforms wherever they approached workers at the various meetings which they attended. Reports also show that various shop nuclei had individual comrades from the outside units distribute platforms in front of their shops. One shoe shop unit reported that it distributed the platforms within the shop.

A good example was shown in Section 2, composed of about 60 shop nuclei and only 5 street units. They have disposed of over 63,000 platforms. The work of this Section is especially gratifying because it proves to those Sections which have shop nuclei, that it is possible to sell our literature through Party nuclei (the attitude to date having been for example, "Well, we have 9 street units which sell literature and 3 are shop nuclei which are absolved from the sale of literature"). It is well to note in connection with Section 2 that it also paid in full for all its election platforms as well as for all other literature.

Where the comrades went about the house to house canvassing seriously, pamphlets were sold. Where the chairman at an open air meeting announced the platforms and devoted a few minutes towards their sale, the platforms were

sold; where platforms were taken in connection with **Daily Worker** canvassing, platforms were sold; where a speaker attempted to make a collection for free distribution at open air meetings, this attempt was successful.

A few years ago, when the Party needed 25,000 signatures in order to get on the ballot, there was a real system of house to house canvassing in force. Every Party member had to show by his activity card that he went for signatures at least once a week. The correctness of the method proved itself in practice. The signatures were obtained and the Party appeared on the ballot.

We are not doing anywhere near the amount of canvassing that was done during that period and there is a resulting lack of personal contact with individual workers, for inducing them to vote Communist.

Further, the reports show that wherever the Sections carried out the instructions, considerable progress was made, but that in the main the Section lost much valuable time before they followed our instructions.

The platforms were printed far enough in advance to permit successful distribution. We made a mistake in the late appearance of the pamphlet "Why You Should Vote Communist." This pamphlet appeared 10 to 12 days before the election date. This necessitated dumping a quantity on each individual Section in accordance with its membership. This was not very helpful. It not only prevented the sale of these pamphlets, 50,000 in number, but it also checked further sale of the 50,000 platforms that the Sections had on hand. The Sections became panic-stricken with this additional dumping and they immediately began to give everything away free.

We must learn from our mistakes. Last year we did the same thing, with the appearance of the Fusion pamphlet towards the end of the campaign. Next year we must avoid such slipshod distribution of a pamphlet by seeing to it that it is written and printed in plenty of time for proper distribution.

The mass organizations played very little role in the distribution of the English platforms.

The City Committee of the I.W.O. had pledged that it would distribute 50,000 platforms. It took 20,000. Two weeks before the election date it still had 10,000 on hand, and no attempt was being made to carry out its plan that each branch should receive a certain quota and that an ideological campaign should be carried on for the distribution and sale of these platforms.

The English workers' clubs took 10,000.

The Jewish workers clubs took 10,000; the Women's Councils, a few hundred.

The only Union that took any platforms was the Needle Trades Workers Industrial Union, which took 10,000 platforms. We have as yet no report as to how these were distributed, but when we consider that over 50,000 workers belong to our Industrial unions, and add those belonging to the oppositions and the independent unions, we can safely state that as far as the unions are concerned the usual failure on the literature front is to be recorded. This failure by the unions in the distribution of literature in our campaigns must be stopped, and energetic steps must be taken to end once and for all this exemption of unions from the general distribution of literature. They must approach the workers not only with the issue of their every-day demands, but also with literature, in order to raise the political level of the membership.

It will be necessary to go directly to the membership through our daily press and arouse them to help in raising the political level of the trade union members.

In summing up the distribution of election campaign platforms through the Party, the following conclusions can be arrived at:

1. It is better from a political angle to sell our Party platforms. (This effects an immediate contact between us and the individual worker.)

2. The platforms should be printed early enough to allow for at least a ten-week distribution.

3. During the election campaign we must re-establish the system that was in force when we had to go out for signatures, namely, that every Party member be compelled to give no less than one night a week for canvassing in a particular territory and that activity records be kept.

4. After a particular canvass has taken place in assigned houses, the comrades engaged in the distribution of these platforms should make out a written report of each apartment in a week's time, and another committee should follow up the contacts of the first committee, and try to convince the occupants of the house, on the basis of the platforms sold and distributed, to vote Communist.

5. At all open air meetings the platform should be announced and a collection made for its free distribution.

6. The fractions of the trade unions and mass organizations should be made personally responsible for an effective distribution of our platforms.

Over 250,000 people bought platforms. We could have sold 1,000,000 if the Party membership had really tried.

But even such superficial efforts and the fact that 250,000 people bought 250,000 platforms, unquestionably played an important role in our real success at the polls. In this case, literature in the form of the Party platform acted as an organizer for the Party.

Even our limited success in the distribution of the platforms shows the tremendous possibilities for distribution of **basic revolutionary literature** treating the question of **Soviet Power and the Communist way out**. It shows that workers are ready to read our message, if we bring it to them.

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## Suggestions For Discussions

By A. H., Sec. 3, Dist. 3.

**A**LTHOUGH political discussions are not possible at every meeting of every unit, here's something that is possible at every meeting: a rapid survey of the week's news as reported by the **Daily Worker**. Such a survey should cover, let us say, first the strike situation for the week, then other political and economic events in America and then events throughout the world.

The leader of these surveys should do it in a questioning rather than in a lecture-room manner. He should ask questions concerning, for instance, location of strikes, number of strikers, how long the strike has been going on, what the union is doing, etc. He should be able to bring to the attention of all the comrades the special columns in the **Daily Worker** and also all of the feature articles.

Wherever this plan is put into effect, the comrades will be spurred on to more careful, more thorough reading of the **Daily Worker**. They will vie for the prominence of being able to answer the most questions in the most satisfactory manner. And since a different leader of the survey should be chosen (by the Agit-prop director) each week, they will strain to prepare themselves for this position. Everyone should be given a chance to lead such a survey, no matter how unsatisfactory a comrade's information may have been the week before.

Sticking to such a plan for a few weeks (of course, it should be made permanent) will raise the political level of any unit considerably. It will enliven the meeting, will provide something the comrades will look forward to. And besides affecting the general tone of their activity it will make them better distributors of the **Daily Worker**.

At first this plan may not work very well. The reason will be that the comrades are not well enough informed to carry it through quickly or that the leader has not led the survey in a lively manner. Wherever this should be the case, there is all the more reason to concentrate on making such a survey an integral part of every unit meeting. When carried out correctly, it should take no more than ten minutes.